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Addendum on sets as referencing devices
'6' is the name of 6 and '6' refers to 6. But we don't tend to think of '6' as an object to be quantified over. On the other hand, '{6}' is the name of {6}. '{6}' refers to {6}, and {6} refers to 6. Yet we do tend to think of sets like {6} as objects---primarily because they are the targets of reference: {{6}, 7} refers to {6}---and we do, when doing mathematics, quantify over them. So sets seem to occupy a kind of no man's land---they both refer and are referred to. This further confuses their 'ontological status'. The situation is perhaps analogous to Frege's concept Horse which is primarily a concept, not an object, but when talked about as opposed to with, has to be seen as an object.
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