Bill, let me see if I have understood you. You are saying
(a) If we accept your reader's argument then we conclude that some particular (the statue, the fist) can be reduced to a non-identical particular (the lump, the hand). But this is incoherent.
(b) To rescue reductionism we must reject the argument and you do so by denying premise 1. This leads to a dualism of statue/hunk and fist/hand where two numerically distinct things occupy the one spatio-temporal location.
(c) Options (a) and (b) are equally reasonable/unreasonable.I, as you will have guessed, reject (3). Now, we have been here before several times I know, but please bear with me. I think the crux of this is reference. Let me take the second part of (3) first. Let's imagine the hunk/statue before us on a table. If we are to accept (3.2) then we must accept the following sentence:
This (pointing with the right hand to the statue) does not have the modal property of being possibly such as to be a non-statue.I think this is plainly false. Turning to (3.1), If we are to accept (3.1) we must accept the following:
This (pointing with the right hand to the hunk) has the property of existing at times at which that (pointing with the left hand to the statue) does not exist.I think this is plainly contradictory. Upshot: The statue and the hunk are indiscernible and identical.
Where do I think we are inclined to go wrong in all this? I suspect our mistake is to associate a type with the referring terms ('the hunk', 'the statue') rather than with the individual referred to. This mistake is easily made when the referring terms involve common nouns. The mistake is less easily made if we use proper names as referring terms, but since we tend to associate proper names with descriptions, and in this case the descriptions will involve common nouns, the mistake can still occur. I hope I've shown that if we use demonstratives the chance of making the mistake is nil.
This has cured me of any remaining descriptivism!
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