Incomplete objects

Bill continues his musings on intentionality here, with emphasis on the idea of 'intentional incompleteness'. Consider,
  • Tom is thinking about a unicorn, but Tom does not think every possible thought about a unicorn.
  • Jake wants a cigarette, but Jake does not want every possible aspect of a cigarette.
  • Bill sees his car, but Bill does not see every possible aspect of his car.
Bill takes this as evidence that Tom's thinking, Jake's wanting, and Bill's seeing have 'incomplete objects'. He says,
Suppose you see my car.  You won't help being able to see it is as bright yellowish-green sport-utility vehicle.  But you could easily see it without seeing it as a 2013 Jeep Wrangler.  I take this to imply that the set of perceived aspects of any object of perception not only can be but must be incomplete.
Yes indeed.  That agrees with the above.  But then he goes on,
But now it seems we have a problem. If that which is (phenomenlogically, not spatially) before my mind is necessarily property-incomplete, then either seeing is not existentially loaded, or existentially loaded seeing is not an intentional state. To put the problem as an aporetic tetrad:
  1. If S sees x, then x exists
  2. Seeing is an intentional state
  3. Every intentional state has an aspectual shape: its object is incomplete
  4. Nothing that exists is incomplete.
How does he justify the move from an incomplete set of aspects to an incomplete object?

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