I am David Brightly

With the Western Front bogged down in mutual misunderstanding Ed Ockham and Bill Vallicella have opened up an Eastern Front.  I suspect the fighting will be less intense here, but we will see.   Bill certainly and Ed possibly holds that reincarnation is logically possible.   But we are already in trouble for the following three propositions seem inconsistent:
1. It is logically possible that one and the same self (ego, I) have two consecutive but non-overlapping numerically distinct bodies.
2. There are no unembodied or disembodied referents of uses of the first-person singular pronoun.
3. It is not logically possible that one and the same thing have two beginnings of existence (John Locke).
Bill's strategy is to undermine (2), so he has launched into an analysis of the pronoun I.  He says something interesting:
But that it is the sense of a physical thing is no part of the sense of 'I.'  We understand fully the sense of this term without understanding it to be the sense of a physical thing, a sense that presents or mediates reference to a physical thing.  Indeed, considerations adduced by Anscombe and Castaneda show that the 'I'-sense cannot be the sense of a physical thing.
I'm sure that we will get on to Anscombe's and Castaneda's arguments in due course.  But I wonder about this, especially the underlined sentence.  Yesterday I used the words 'I am David Brightly' in earnest, introducing myself in the flesh to someone who knew of me from a third party and who had not met me before though we had spoken on the phone.  That someone learned something with that utterance, and much of what they learned could be said to be physical, I think.  So what is Bill driving at here?

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