. . . the question of whether a thing could exist without existing in the present. The logical presentist might then question what is meant by ‘no longer exists’. The natural interpretation is ‘existed, but does not exist’. But then the thing doesn’t exist, period. Using tensed language we can say, truly, that Boethius existed, but does not exist. Why not be satisfied with this?
He goes on to say,
My claim is that there is a clear difference between ‘exist(s)’ used in the present-tensed way and ‘exist(s)’ used to express existence period, i.e., existence simpliciter.
And,
What I deny, and what the Ostrich seems to affirm, is that the passage of time has annihilated the locale [Scollay Square] in question.
I suspect that by ‘period’ Ostrich means something like ‘QED’, or ‘no more to be said’. His preceding ‘doesn’t exist’ is present-tensed and does not express existence simpliciter. I doubt that Ostrich means to affirm that time has annihilated Scollay Square, if ‘annihilation’ is taken to mean undoing its status as part of the world’s furniture. The latter term, as I understand it, is time-independent, hence constant.
But let me accept Bill’s concept of existence simpliciter. I will write it as ‘exist*’. So ‘Boethius exist*’ is true but ‘Holmes exist*’ is false. How does this help with the truth-making of ‘Boethius existed’? The argument would seem to be that ‘Boethius exist*’ declares Boethius eligible to make-true ‘Boethius existed’. But this making-true would appear to hold at times prior to Boethius’s temporal existence.
The difficulty as I see it is that ‘Boethius existed’ expresses a relation between two distinct moments in time: some unspecified moment when Boethius did indeed exist, and the present. It’s hard to see how the existence of a state of affairs at some single moment can support such a relation. This notion of truth-making is too weak.
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